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A study of international arbitral procedures provides a way to gain
some insight into questions of international conflict and cooperation. This
article considers the role that counterclaims play in international tribu-
nals and the conditions under which counterclaims may be brought.' I
begin by clarifying the notion of a counterclaim and then discuss what
principles govern the admissibility of counterclaims before national and
international bodies.
To determine what role counterclaims have traditionally played in
international legal process, I will examine various rules on counterclaims:
domestic rules, rules of the International Court of Justice, and rules of
international arbitral tribunals. After having investigated the different
counterclaims rules and the principles which govern their admissibility, I
will discuss whether or not human rights counterclaims might be possible.
Some parties may choose not to submit to the jurisdiction of a tribu-
nal if they anticipate encountering human rights counterclaims, but
others might be willing to do so in order to clear their names before the
* B.A., Harvard-Radcliffe, 1981; Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1987. Assis-
tant Professor of Political Science, University of Southern California. The author is grateful
to Professor Stefan Riesenfeld for drawing her attention to many important references.
1. Although the use of counterclaims is a widespread practice in both domestic and
international litigation, there is virtually no theoretical discussion of them in the legal litera-
ture to date. Some articles of interest include: Larschan & Mirfendereski, The Status of
Counterclaims in International Law, with Particular Reference to International Arbitra-
tion Involving a Private Party and a Foreign State, 31 DEN. J. INT'L L.& POL'Y 1 (1986); M.
Whiteman, 12 Digest of International Law, Dept. of State Pub. No. 8586, 1079 (Aug.1971);
Tigar, Automatic Extinction of Cross Demands: Compensation from Rome to California, 53
CALIF. L. REV. 224 (1965) [hereinafter Tigar]; Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory
Counterclaim Rule Under Modern Pleading, 38 MINN. L. REv. 423 (1954) [hereinafter
Wright]; Scelle, Report on Arbitration Procedure, A/CN.4/18 (March 21, 1950) at 58-59, II
Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM. (1950) at 136 - 137; Genet, Les Demandes Reconventionelles et la
Procedure de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale, 65 R.D.I.L.C. 145, 178 (1938);
Anzilotti, La Demande Reconventionnelle en Procedure Internationale, 57 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 857 (1930); Anzilotti, La Reconvenzione Nella Procedura Interna-
zionale, SCRiTrl DELLA FACOLTA GIURIDICA DI ROMA IN ONORE DI ANTONIO SALANDRA 341-360
(1928).
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international community. In theory, nothing in the arbitral rules of proce-
dure precludes human rights counterclaims, but in practice social psycho-
logical factors such as a nation's fear of being vilified may make it diffi-
cult to use counterclaims as a vehicle for advancing human rights.
Assuming that counterclaims do have potential for raising human rights
issues in international dispute resolution, they deserve serious considera-
tion by the legal profession. Their use may have far-reaching implications
for diplomatic relations among nations.
II. U.S. COUNTERCLAIMS
A. Counterclaims in General
A counterclaim has been defined as "a claim presented by a defend-
ant in opposition to or deduction from the claim of the plaintiff."2 It is
distinguished from a defense in that it does not deny the cause of action
or the plaintiffs right to recover. Instead, it is an assertion of a separate
cause of action against the plaintiff which is intended to offset in whole or
in part the original claim. Often counterclaims and defenses are confused
because they are based upon the same set of facts. For this reason Rule
8(c) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on affirmative
defenses provides that "when a party has mistakenly designated a de-
fense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on
terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a
proper designation." Most scholars attribute the concept and definition of
the counterclaim to David Dudley Field, the prominent nineteenth cen-
tury legal reformer and codifier. Although the name itself may be mod-
ern, the basic idea of the counterclaim is not.'
The counterclaim is a legal device designed to enhance judicial effi-
ciency by coordinating the handling of multiple claims at once. Treating
the counterclaim and claim simultaneously insures consistent results
which would not be guaranteed if the claims were reviewed separately. A
counterclaim may serve the purpose of avoiding financial loss which can
occur if there is a delay between the adjudication of the original claim
and the second claim. Admitting a counterclaim may also yield a more
fair result by ensuring that additional facts and legal obligations are not
ignored.
B. Compulsory vs. Permissive Counterclaims
There are basically two different types of counterclaims in the
United States: compulsory and permissive. A compulsory counterclaim,
under Rule 13(a) of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is defined
as any claim that a party to a civil suit in a federal court has which
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 315 (5th ed. 1979)
3. For insightful conceptual and historical analyses, see Tigar, supra note 1, and White-
man, supra note 1.
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"arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction"
and "must be pleaded as a counterclaim in that suit, unless such claim is
the subject of another pending action at the time the suit commenced".
Failure to assert the compulsory counterclaim results in its loss through
the doctrine of res judicata.
A permissive counterclaim under Rule 13 (b) provides that a plead-
ing may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim. Underlying the provision for permissive coun-
terclaims is the notion that it is not fair to require a party to pay com-
pensation or damages before it has received its due from the party that
brought the original claim. It is in the interest of fairness that debts be-
tween the parties be settled, whether related or not, before compelling
payment in the instant case.
There is a basic difference between compulsory and permissive coun-
terclaims. The compulsory counterclaim is required to be based on a
claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the sub-
ject matter of the opposing party's claim. A permissive counterclaim, by
contrast, is any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim." The term 'transaction' has been the source of much debate
and has been the subject of many interpretations. Although U.S. judicial
experience indicates that there has been considerable difficulty in fixing a




The key criterion for determining the admissibility of counterclaims
in international tribunals is the degree to which the counterclaim is re-
4. The four tests that different courts have used to differentiate between compulsory
and permissive counterclaims are as follows:
1. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute both the plaintiff's
claim and the counterclaim?
2. Are the issues of fact and law on the claim and the counterclaim largely the
same?
3. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on the defendant's claim absent
the compulsory counterclaim rule?
4. Is there any logical relation between the plaintiff's claim and the
counterclaim?
For further discussion on these tests, see Wright, supra note 1, at 438.
5. For further discussion of the transaction definition problem, see Draft Convention on
Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States; see also 26 AM. J. INT'L LAW (Supp.
1932), at 493, and Wright, supra note 1, at 437.
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lated to the original claim. For the most part international tribunals will
only consider counterclaims which resemble what U.S. procedure terms
'compulsory'.' For compulsory counterclaims there is no real issue of per-
sonal jurisdiction because the parties consented to the jurisdiction of the
tribunal when the claim was brought. If there are other parties which
would have to be included as a consequence of admitting a counterclaim,
then there might be some obstacle posed by personal jurisdiction require-
ments. Generally the tribunal will have jurisdiction over the parties
linked to the claim and counterclaim, but this will not automatically pro-
vide it with subject matter jurisdiction. Insofar as there is a direct con-
nection between the counterclaim and the claim, the jurisdictional re-
quirement will be satisfied.' The main difficulty is to establish standards
by which to measure the direct connection. In theory it should be possible
to insist upon directness, but in practice it may prove difficult to use that
criterion.
It has been asserted that as with compulsory counterclaims in the
United States, these types of counterclaims are also subject to the doc-
trine of res judicata in international litigation. If a party had a counter-
claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence and neglected to
raise it, then the party would not be able to do so later. One authority in
international arbitration law, Nantwi, takes this view:
The binding force of arbitration awards may also be found to be simi-
larly based on the principle of res judicata. It is inherent in the insti-
tution of arbitration as it is in judicial settlement. The most forthright
restatement of the principle in recent arbitration proceedings is to be
credited to the Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal in its final award
(1941) where it was expressed as follows:
"That the sanctity of res judicata attaches to a final deci-
sion of an international tribunal is an essential and settled rule
of international law. If it is true that international relations
based on law and justice require arbitral and judicial adjudica-
tion of international disputes, it is equally true that such adjudi-
cation must, in principle, remain unchallenged, if it is to be ef-
fective to that end.
'" 8
For the most part, however, there will be jurisdiction over claims so long
as both parties consent. Therefore, although one suspects that for inter-
national litigation there would be res judicata effect, it is not self-evident
and remains an open question.
6. Even though the terminology of 'compulsory' and 'permissive' counterclaims is de-
rived from U.S. judicial practices, it provides a useful framework for classifying counter-
claims in the international arena.
7. It was upon the jurisdictional questions and the issue of sufficient connection that
the noted publicist Brownlie laid emphasis. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 412 (1966).
8. NANTWi, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND ARBITRAL
AWARDS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (1966).
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The assumption that permissive counterclaims are not admissible
before international tribunals must be questioned. Ordinarily, when the
tribunal is one of general as opposed to limited jurisdiction, the arbitra-
tors or judges have greater latitude in determining what falls within the
scope of the tribunal's authority. The argument could be made that it is
in the interest of justice to allow permissive counterclaims before interna-
tional tribunals, as the claims might otherwise not be heard. Moreover, in
some legal systems, once the tribunal has been convened to hear a dis-
pute, it is considered appropriate to resolve multiple issues and claims at
one time.9 As the objective of dispute settlement is catharsis, claims that
might be regarded as permissive counterclaims are allowed in order to
restore harmony.
B. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The first example of the way counterclaims are handled can be seen
in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,1" which entered into force in
late 1976:
S.1607 Counterclaims
In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a foreign state
intervenes, in a court of the United States or of a State, the foreign
state shall not be accorded immunity with respect to any counterclaim
(a) for which a foreign state would not be entitled to immunity under
section 1605 of this chapter had such claim been brought in a separate
action against the foreign state; or
(b) arising out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the sub-
ject matter of the claim of the foreign state; or
(c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding
in amount or differing in kind from that sought by the foreign state.
The same language characterizing acceptable counterclaims appears in
(b) that the counterclaim arise out of the same transaction or occurrence
as the subject matter of the original claim.
The legislative history of Section 1607 explains why immunity is de-
nied in three situations. First, Article I of the European Convention on
State Immunity" provides that "immunity would be denied as to any
counterclaim for which the foreign state would not be entitled to immu-
nity under 1605, if the counterclaim had been brought as a direct claim in
a separate action against the foreign state."'" The second situation in
which immunity is suspended is when the counterclaim arises out of the
9. See, e.g., GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHO-
DESIA (1955).
10. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 28 U.S.C.S. 1607.
11. Council of Europe: European Convention on State Immunity and Additional Proto-
col, Done at Basel, May 16, 1972, reprinted at 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972).
12. 94th Cong. 2d sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5522
(1976).
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same transaction or occurrence as the main claim despite sections 1604-
1606 which grant immunity. Even if the foreign state would ordinarily be
entitled to immunity, in this circumstance it is denied because it would
be unfair to allow a foreign state to bring or intervene in a particular
transaction or occurrence and not face liabilities connected with the same
matter. In short, ". . .it should not obtain the benefits of litigation before
U.S. courts while avoiding any legal liabilities claimed against it and aris-
ing out of the same transaction or occurrence."' 3 Third, even if the for-
eign state is immune under subsections (a) and (b), it is nevertheless not
immune from subsection (c), which provides that the amount of the coun-
terclaim may not exceed the amount sought in the underlying claim.' In
setting out the extent of sovereign liability, the United States made it
clear that as far as direct counterclaims are concerned, immunity will not
be granted up to the amount of the original claim.
In a provocative article on counterclaims against a sovereign plaintiff,
Simmond criticizes the "same subject matter" test as failing to provide an
effective definition. He is interested in the question of whether "indepen-
dent" counterclaims may be asserted against sovereign plaintiffs. While
he does not take the position that all counterclaims should be allowed, he
does advocate clarification of the "limits within which 'disconnected' or
'unrelated' matters may be brought into, or excluded from a suit through
the counterclaim. '"1 5
C. International Court of Justice
Although it is not clear how often counterclaims are asserted before
international tribunals, some authorities contend that they have been rel-
atively rare.' Historically, the International Court of Justice did not rec-
ognize counterclaims. There were no provisions for them in the Hague
Conventions of 1899'" and 19078 or by the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice,' 9 the Convention of 1907 for the Establish-
13. Id.
14. Subsection (c) is the codification of the rule enunciated in National Bank v. Repub-
lic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
15. Simmonds, Implied Waiver of Immunity: Permissible Counterclaims Against a
Sovereign Plaintiff, 9 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 334, 340 (1960).
16. See Whiteman, supra note 1, at 1081; J.H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE 139 (1910). Some of the cases in which counterclaims were used included:
Chorzow Factory Case, Series A, No.17, Sept.13, 1928; The Diversion of Water From the
Meuse, Series A/B, No.70, June 28, 1937; U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(provisional measures), ICJ Reports at 15 (1979).
17. Convention for the Peaceful Adjustment of International Differences, concluded at
The Hague on July 29, 1899, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L. L. 107 (Supp. 1907). [Hague Con-
vention of 1899].
18. The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, con-
cluded at The Hague on October 18, 1907, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L. L. 43 (Supp. 1908).
19. See generally, FACH1RI, THE PERMANENT COURT OF JUSTICE-ITS CONSTITUTION,
PROCEDURE & WORK (1925).
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ment of a Central American Court of Justice,"0 or by the Convention of 7
February 1923 for the Establishment of an International Central Ameri-
can Tribunal.2 The Institute of International Law, in its Rules of 28 Au-
gust 1875 (Article 17) rejected the principle of admissibility of the coun-
terclaim whenever it had not been provided for in the compromis or
accepted by the parties.2"
The Statute of the Court is silent on the question of counterclaims,
but there is provision made for them in the rules. In the 1922 rules, Arti-
cle 40 elaborated on the elements of cases and counter-cases. The fourth
item mentioned under counter-cases was: conclusions based on the facts
stated, these conclusions may include counter-claims, in so far as the lat-
ter come within the jurisdiction of the Court.23 Since the Court has juris-
diction over the claim, if the counterclaim is directly related, there should
be no obstacle to jurisdiction. Implicit is that counterclaims not directly
related or permissive counterclaims in the American legal system would
not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.2 4
Article 63, which was adopted in the amended 1946 Rules is a more
elaborate rule:
When proceedings have been instituted by means of an application, a
counter-claim may be presented in the submissions of the Counter-
Memorial, provided that such counter-claim is directly connected with
the subject-matter of the application and that it comes within the ju-
risdiction of the Court. In the event of doubt as to the connection
between the question presented by way of counter-claim and the sub-
ject-matter of the application of the Court shall, after due examina-
tion, direct whether or not the question thus presented shall be joined
to the original proceedings.25
Since the Court may "after due examination" permit the counter-
claim to be brought, a permissive counterclaim might be feasible, the only
limitation being jurisdiction. The court has jurisdiction over the subject-
matter only if both parties consent. Without mutual consent, the Court
would have difficulty justifying acceptance of permissive counterclaims.
The rules themselves, however, do not preclude the introduction of coun-
terclaims unrelated to the principal claim.
20. Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice, signed at
Washington, D.C., Dec. 20, 1907, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (Supp. 1908).
21. Convention for the Establishment of an International Central American Tribunal,
signed at Washington, D.C., Feb. 7, 1923, (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua,
and Costa Rica), reprinted in 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (Supp. 1923).
22. See Solution Pacifique des Differences Internationaux, I ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUTE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 60 (art. 17) (1928 ed.).
23. 1926 P.C.I.J. Acts & Docs. 75 (ser. D) § 7.
24. See HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920 - 1942 (1943),
at 430.
25. Rules of the Court, 1946 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 54, 74 (ser. D) No. 1. See also, Docu-
MENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 177 (S. Rosenne ed. 1979).
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The Court adopted revised rules once again in 1978 which contain
the same substantive content as the 1946 Rule. 6 Furthermore, Section 3
allows for substantially more discretion. The Court can decide whether or
not the counterclaim shall survive and for the sake of administrative con-
venience, the Court may join the proceedings in two or more cases (Arti-
cle 17). There are no procedural barriers to bringing counterclaims re-
lated only tangentially so long as the Court determines that the
counterclaim is directly connected.
Article 89 provides that if the course of proceedings began by means
of an application, discontinuance depends on the consent of both parties
unless the respondent has not yet taken any steps in the proceedings, in
which case the removal occurs immediately. If the consent of both parties
is required to end consideration of the case, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that the removal of the counterclaim would also require the consent
of both, particularly if the opportunity to present a counterclaim depends
on mutual agreement by both parties. It might then be possible to remove
the claim, but not the counterclaim. Since one purpose of allowing coun-
terclaims is to resolve all aspects of a particular dispute it might not
make sense to dismiss one without the other, but it does appear to be
procedurally feasible to allow the counterclaim to survive the demise of
the original claim.
There is a danger that counterclaims, because they would attract
more parties, might discourage the original parties from using the inter-
national dispute settlement mechanisms.27 Article 81(2)(c) provides for
third party intervention. Clearly, the more counterclaims which arise, the
greater the chances that third parties will wish to intervene.
D. Use of Counterclaims in International Arbitration
1. Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure
Article 19 of the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, adopted by the
International Law Commission in 19588, makes clear the importance of
the direct connection standard. Although it addresses the question of
26. 1978 Rules of the Court, Part III, § D, subsec. 3, Article 80, Counterclaims:
1. A counterclaim may be presented provided that it is directly connected with
the subject matter of the claim of the other party and that it comes within the
jurisdiction of the Court.
2. A counterclaim shall be made in the Counter-Memorial of the party
presenting it, and shall appear as part of the submissions of that party.
3. In the event of doubt as to the connection between the question presented
by way of counterclaim and the subject-matter of the claim of the other party
the Court shall, after hearing the parties, decide whether or not the question
thus presented shall be joined to the original proceedings.
27. See T.O. ELIAS, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT AND SOME CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS:
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-92 (1983).
28. The 1958 Convention was adopted as international law on June 7, 1959. 13 U.N.




which counterclaims are admissible in the absence of provisions for a
counterclaim in a compromis, it may also suggest what the consensus is as
to the admissibility of counterclaims:
In the absence of any agreement to the contrary implied by the under-
taking to arbitrate or contained in the compromis, the tribunal shall
decide on any ancillary claims which it considers to be inseparable
from the subject-matter of the dispute and necessary for its final
settlement.2 9
In 1985 the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) developed a model arbitration law30 , designed to assist na-
tions in drafting laws which adhere to the provisions of the 1958
Convention.
2. Rules of Arbitration Institutions3
In the Procedure of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration
Commission, there is a counterclaim provision in Article 19.1:
In his statement of defense, or at a later stage in the arbitral proceed-
ings if the arbitral tribunal decides that the delay was justified under
the circumstances, the respondent may make a counterclaim arising
out of the same contract or rely on a claim arising out of the same
contract for the purpose of set-off.
32
This provision is narrower in scope than others as it limits counterclaims
to those which relate to the same contract rather than the same transac-
tion or occurrence.
The Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Foreign Trade Arbitration
Committee of the China Committee for the Promotion of International
Trade also provides for counterclaims: "the defendant may file a counter-
claim against a claim over which the Arbitration Committee has assumed
jurisdiction. '3 The Rules of the Maritime Arbitration Committee of
China provide that a defendant may file a counterclaim against the plain-
tiff in cases "of which the Maritime Arbitration Commission has taken
29. 1958 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 38, 85.
30. The final draft of this model law on International Commercial Arbitration can be
found in the Report of the UNCITRAL Law on the Work of its 18th Session, June 3-21,
1985, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp.(No.17) at 82-94, U.N.Doc. A/40/17 (1985). For further discus-
sion, see McNerney & Esplugues, International Commercial Arbitration: The UNCITRAL
Model Law, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 47 (1986).
31. Easy access to the rules of several international arbitral tribunals is found in 1
V.WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS; PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 305-307 (1979).
32. Article 19.3, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration
Commission, (as amended and in effect January 1, 1978), reprinted in III YEARBOOK: COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION 235 (P. Sanders ed. 1978).
33. Rule 24, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commit-
tee of the China Committee for the promotion of International Trade (adopted March 31,
1956), I1 YEARBOOK: COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 246 (P. Sanders ed. 1978).
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cognizance. ' 's34
The Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce state that any counterclaim or pleading by way of set-off may
be based only on a legal relationship covered by the arbitration agree-
ment." Rule 14.1(d) states that a specific counterclaim should be con-
tained in the Statement of Claim or Defense.
The rules of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in section 1, Article
11, provide that: "the respondent may introduce a counter-claim against
the claimant, provided that this counter-claim be directly connected with
the subject-matter of the request. The Tribunal, constituted in order to
decide on the principal claim, shall likewise decide on the counter-
claim.' '3 6 These rules allow for substantial discretion on the part of the
tribunal, and thus it is possible that permissive counterclaims might be
asserted.
Rule 40 of the rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) is concerned with ancillary claims, includ-
ing counterclaims. Carefully constructed, it exemplifies a standard provi-
sion for counterclaims in several respects:
Rule 40 - Ancillary Claims
(1) Except as the parties otherwise agree, a party may present an inci-
dental or additional claim or counter-claim arising directly out of the
subject-matter dispute, provided that such ancillary claim is within
the scope of the consent of the parties and is otherwise within 'the
jurisdiction of the Centre.
(2) An incidental or additional claim shall be presented not later than
in the reply and a counter-claim no later than in the counter-memo-
rial, unless the Tribunal, upon justification by the party presenting
the ancillary claim and upon considering any objection of the other
party, authorizes the presentation of the claim at a later stage in the
proceedings.
(3) The Tribunal shall fix a time limit within which the party against
which an ancillary claim is presented may file its observations
thereon."
The ICSID rule stresses that the counterclaim must arise directly out of
the subject-matter of the original claim. The Notes elaborate further on
34. Rule 26, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Maritime Arbitration Commission of
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (adopted January 8, 1959). Id.
at 257.
35. Rule 14.2(d), Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Com-
merce (in force from October 1, 1976), III YEARBOOK: COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 256 (1978).
36. Permanent Court of Arbitration, Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for the Set-
tlement of International Disputes between Two Parties of which Only One is a State, § I,
Art. 11 (1962), reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Doc. 1.13 (C.
Schmitthoff ed. 1975).
37. Rule 40, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) repro-




the direct connection requirement; the factual connection between the
original claim and the ancillary claim must be so close that adjudication
of the ancillary claim is necessary to achieve the final settlement of the
dispute. The object is to dispose of claims arising out of the same subject-
matter. The provision that the claim must arise out of the same dispute is
a broader requirement than that it arise from the same transaction or
contract. Thus, the scope of the subject matter can be partly determined
by the phrasing of the source from which it is derived. There must also be
consent of the parties and the jurisdiction of the Centre. Section 41(2)
provides that the Tribunal "may on its own initiative consider, at any
stage of the proceeding, whether the dispute or any ancillary claim before
it is within the jurisdiction of the Centre and within its own compe-
tence". 38 Since the Tribunal is the judge of its own competence, it ulti-
mately has the discretion to admit whatever counterclaims it wishes.
3. UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules
Of great interest are the counterclaim provisions of the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). UNCI-
TRAL prepares new international conventions and model rules and advo-
cates uniform interpretation and application of them, in an effort to
harmonize the law of international trade. One of its priorities has been to
draft a set of rules for international commercial arbitration, particularly
for optional use in ad hoc arbitration. In May 1976, the Commission
adopted these UNCITRAL arbitral rules, and in December 1976 the U.N.
General Assembly recommended that they be used for the settlement of
disputes arising from various types of contracts in international com-
merce.3  So, UNCITRAL represents the culmination of efforts to devise a
draft set of arbitration rules. Since they may be widely used, the counter-
claim provision is important for the purposes of this discussion:
Article 19
1. Within a period of time to be determined by the arbitral tribunal,
the respondent shall communicate his statement of defense in writing
to the claimant and to each of the arbitrators.
3. In his statement of defense, or at a later stage in the arbitral pro-
ceedings if the arbitral tribunal decides that the delay was justified
under the circumstances, the respondent may make a counterclaim
arising out of the same contract or rely on a claim arising out of the
same contract for the purpose of a set-off.
4. The provisions of Article 18, paragraph 2, shall apply to a counter-
claim and a claim relied on for the purpose of a set-off.40
38. Rule 41(2), Rules of Procedure, supra note 33, at 527.
39. UNCITRAL adopted the Arbitral Rules on April 28, 1976, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/31/17, ch. V., § C. The U.N. General Assembly then recommended
their use for various contractual disputes in international commerce on Dec. 15, 1976, G.A.
Res. 31/98 (1976).
40. UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules, Report of the U.N. Commission on International Trade
Law, 9th sess., 12 April - 7 May, 1976, G.A. 31st sess., Supp.No.17 (A/31/17). Reprinted in 4
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Although the rule reflects a preference for having the counterclaim as-
serted in the statement of defense, the legislative history makes it clear
that it was considered desirable to retain flexibility."' The result was a
rule which stipulates that the counterclaim be raised in the statement of
defense unless circumstances are such that it becomes necessary to raise
it subsequently.
The arbitrators have considerable discretion with respect to jurisdic-
tion, when a counterclaim can be raised, and the interpretation of proce-
dures (Article 15(1)), but they are nonetheless constrained by the rules.
The respondent may only make a counterclaim which arises out of the
same contract for the purpose of a set-off. The counterclaim must, there-
fore, be directly related to the original claim, since both must be linked to
the contract in question. UNCITRAL's is a narrowly defined rule. In ad-
dition, claims may not be amended in such a manner that the amended
claim falls outside the scope of either the arbitration clause or the sepa-
rate arbitration agreement. 2 Underlying all the procedural rules is the
idea that the scope of the arbitral agreement is limited and not to be
expanded by amended claims or counterclaims. The UNCITRAL Rules
would most likely allow "compulsory" counterclaims, and disallow "per-
missive" counterclaims.43
The same considerations are reflected in all the arbitral rules; there
must be a relationship between the original claim and the counterclaim,
the arbitral tribunal must have jurisdiction, and time limits are imposed
within which the counterclaim must be presented. It is striking that the
discussion is so terse, since their impact can be great.
4. Permissive Counterclaims: The Del Rio Case
Some might object to the proposal to allow permissive counterclaims
to be brought up in arbitration on the ground that it would deter nations
from utilizing arbitration as a means of dispute settlement. The root of
the problem is attitudinal. A fear exists that arbitration will not resemble
a judicial process and that the arbitrators may substitute a political deci-
sion for a legal one.44 It is reasonable to assume that additional claims
would complicate the dispute settlement process with the possibility that
one party might be displeased with the result. If dissatisfied, the party
might well allege that the arbitrators exceeded their jurisdictional author-
V. WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 413, 421-2 (1952).
41. Id. at 180 - 181.
42. Id. at Article 20.
43. For an example of how the UNCITRAL Rules have been applied, see the Declara-
tion of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the U.S.A. and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981. This Tribunal modified and broadened Rule 19(3) some-
what, and allowed for counterclaims connected to the occurrence or transaction rather than
limiting them to issues arising out of the same contract.
44. See CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 37 (1946).
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ity.45 Although the challenge to jurisdiction might arise if permissive
counterclaims were admitted frequently, this is hardly a problem peculiar
to this device.
One reason for allowing those counterclaims which are directly re-
lated to the subject-matter of the original claim is that it is efficient in
cost and in time to settle both claims at the same time. Since a counter-
claim that is not directly related would not be efficient, it is likely that if
the efficiency rationale is primary, permissive counterclaims would not be
accepted. The efficiency rationale is not served by permissive
counterclaims.
There are very few cases in which the issue of permissive counter-
claims has arisen. One example, however, is the Del Rio case, where a
Mexican-Venezuelan Commission was set up to examine and decide
claims of Mexican citizens against Venezuela.4 6 According to the protocol
of Washington, February 26, 1903, the Commission did not have jurisdic-
tion to decide claims of the Government of Venezuela presented against
the Mexican Republic. The Commission, in an attempt to extricate itself
from the difficulties of the international agreement, sought the consent of
the two parties to consider Venezuelan counterclaims. After an exchange
of notes and telegrams, the Commission received authorization to ex-
amine and decide the counterclaims presented by Venezuela against the
Mexican government. The case demonstrates that it is possible to enlarge
the scope of jurisdiction. A tribunal may extend its competence beyond
that of the original subject matter if the parties consent and waive sub-
ject matter deficiencies. Since the consent of the two parties can confer
jurisdiction, it is possible that counterclaims of any kind could theoreti-
cally be brought before a tribunal. This is an important observation be-
cause it indicates that even though counterclaim rules offer a narrow defi-
nition of what counterclaims are admissible, the parties may consent to
the presentation of counterclaims that do not fit the rule.
5. Drafting Agreements to Provide for Counterclaims
An important reason why a provision for counterclaims should be de-
termined before the international arbitration gets underway is that par-
ties may have different concepts of counterclaims. When two parties and
their counsel come from different legal cultures, there is a danger that
conflict may arise. "Where countries having different legal systems are
represented before a tribunal, the use of technical procedural concepts
from the one or the other legal system is a dangerous matter. ' ' 47 To avoid
45. "The arbitrator has such powers of decision as the parties confer upon him. Unless
his powers are clearly stated and the exact question at issue is precisely stated, dissatisfac-
tion with his award may easily provoke the charge that he has exceeded his jurisdiction." Id.
at 33-34.
46. Del Rio case, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903, Jackson H. Ralston, Senate Doc. No.
316, 58th Congress, 2d sess., at 879 - 888 (1904).
47. A.H. FELLER, THE MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION 228 (1935).
1987
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
clashes" between parties, it is advisable to include provisions for likely
points of contention. Carlston stresses the need for careful planning:
"Disputes and misunderstandings will inevitably arise because of clashes
caused by varying national backgrounds. If arbitration is to carry out suc-
cessfully its task of solving amicably such disputes, the utmost considera-
tion must be given to its procedural aspects."4 s It is not impossible to
overcome the problem of national differences. Lowenfeld argues that a
commitment to the fair administration of justice can allow arbitrators to
overcome the effect of different types of legal training: "Even if their legal
trdditions are different, they must have a common belief in the integrity
of the-Judicial (or arbitral) process."49 If the parties can agree on a coun-
terclaim rule, then there is some hope that the arbitrators could follow it
even if it differed from the rule with which they were familiar.
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNTERCLAIMS: THE U.S.-POLAND ARBITRATION
The potential for using counterclaims to raise human rights issues
has not yet been realized. On December 13, 1981, General Jaruzelski im-
posed martial law in Poland." In response, President Reagan announced
that the United States would impose economic sanctions on Poland, one
of which was the suspension of Polish civil aviation privileges in the
United, States.' The U.S. decision to suspend Polish landing rights and
the subsequent demand by the Polish government for arbitration provide
a context in which to discuss the possibility of allowing the presentation
of human rights counterclaims.
!here was strong reason to believe that the U.S. action was in viola-
tion of a provision of the 1972 U.S.-Polish agreement on civil aviation,
which required that one party notify the other at least one year in ad-
vance of any termination or suspension of any provision."2 The Polish
government demanded that the U.S. enter into an arbitration to deter-
mine what damages LOT, the Polish airline, suffered as a result of the
suspension of its landing privileges. Unfortunately, even though the U.S.
and Poland each appointed an arbitrator, the two arbitrators could not
agree on a third to make up the tribunal, and so there was no progress.5"
48. Carlston, supra note 40, at 6-7.
49. A.F. Lowenfeld, The U.S.-Iranian Dispute Settlement Accords: An Arbitrator
Looks at the Prospects for Arbitration, 36(3) ARB. J. 7 (1981).
50. Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 83 DEPT. STATE BULL. 48
(June 1983).
51. The President's News Conference of Dec.17, 1981, Presidential Doc. Vol.17, at 1379;
Christmas and the Situation in Poland: Address to the Nation, Presidential Doc. Vol.17, at
1404 - 1407 (Dec.23, 1981); Development in Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., App.4 at 42 (Feb.9, 1982).
52. Air Transport Agreement, July 19, 1972, U.S.-Poland, 23 U.S.T. 4269, T.I.A.S. No.
7535., see also Malamut, Aviation: Suspension of Landing Rights of Polish Airlines in the
United4,-tates, 24 HARV. INT'L L.J. 190 (1983).
53. In the interim, the U.S. gradually removed the sanctions. In January 1984 the U.S.
decided to allow 88 charter flights, and then in July 1984 lifted the suspension of landing
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Had the arbitration commenced, however, the U.S. could have as-
serted the violation of Polish citizens' human rights as a counterclaim.
This would have been an extremely interesting development. Not only
would human rights violations have been raised as a counterclaim, but
even more significant would have been the U.S. counterclaim on behalf of
the Polish citizens. Ordinarily a state has standing to present claims and
counterclaims for its own citizens, but this action might have created a
landmark arbitral decision by allowing one state to raise a counterclaim
alleging the human rights violations of citizens of the state which brought
the original claim.
It was arguably in Poland's best interest not to insist upon arbitra-
tion. Poland was, and still is, trying to ameliorate diplomatic relations in
order to gain aid for its ailing economy. In the field of international
human rights the "finger of shame" '54 can be a tremendously powerful
weapon. The U.S. could have made greater efforts to facilitate the arbi-
tration, as it was only the need for a third arbitrator which led to the
stalemate. A more compromising approach might have made the arbitra-
tion possible. It has been suggested that the reason the U.S. sought to
avoid arbitration was that it expected to lose.5
The suspension of the U.S.-Polish civil aviation "illustrates the con-
flict between the great principles of international law, the inviolability of
treaties and the fundamental nature of human rights"." The U.S. reluc-
tance to pursue the arbitration may indicate that the former takes prece-
dence in the international context. Perhaps this is the assumption that
must be changed before counterclaims can be used effectively to cham-
pion human rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Having arranged a forum to settle claims, the parties might see fit to
consent to admitting counterclaims, compulsory or permissive. Cognizant
of a potential counterclaim, a nation might refuse to submit the original
claim to an arbitral tribunal. If, for instance, the counterclaim were the
violation of human rights of members of the other party's family or coun-
try, it is easy, on the one hand, to imagine how rapidly the nation would
withdraw its claim. On the other hand, the country might welcome the
rights for regularly scheduled flights by LOT. On April 16, 1985, in Warsaw, The U.S. and
Poland concluded a new Transport Agreement, there was an exchange of diplomatic notes
and a Memorandum of Understanding, and Poland agreed not to pursue the arbitration.
Letter of November 7, 1986, from John R. Byerly, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of
State. See also the Polish Diplomatic Note, Warsaw, April 16, 1985, certification of transla-
tion May 28, 1985 by Jorge R. Perez, Assistant Chief, translating branch, Dept. of State.
54. This approach has been advocated most strongly by Professor Frank Newman of
Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley, a leading human rights activist and scholar.
55. Malamut, .supra note 52, evaluates possible arguments that the U.S. might have
advanced, such as fraud, voidability, rebus sic stantibus, and human rights, and implies that
none of the arguments would have fared well in arbitration.
56. Id. at 198.
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opportunity to clear itself of charges. It is not obvious whether or not the
nation would automatically reject arbitration. If the country had no idea
that the counterclaim would be asserted, then the question becomes one
of time limits for withdrawing the original claim. There is little reason to
be optimistic about the future of permissive counterclaims before interna-
tional arbitral tribunals, even if allowing them would be a good idea in
theory. The result of admitting them might be to discourage international
arbitrations.
Inefficiency may be the reason given for disallowing human rights
counterclaims, but the underlying motivation is more likely to be the na-
tion's overall attitude towards human rights. Human rights abuses may
not be solved through the legal process until such attitudes change. Theo-
retically, however, counterclaims could provide an avenue to champion
human rights. International arbitration is sometimes the only feasible
method of dispute resolution, and it does have the advantage of usually
being a private, rather than a public, process. For these reasons, it may be
possible to induce states to confront allegations of human rights viola-
tions in an arbitral forum, through the procedure of permissive counter-
claims. This may sound idealistic, but in practical terms the incentive is
monetary. If a party wishes to collect an award through the arbitral pro-
cess, it might be more willing to agree to procedures that allow the human
rights violations to be heard. Individuals may not be able to change in-
grained social attitudes by legal procedure alone, but the use of human
rights counterclaims may be one step in the right direction.
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